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Abstract
Since 2014, observers of Chinese society have noted an
upsurge in Islamophobic sentiment among China's ethnic
majority Han. China's Muslims, in particular those who iden-
tify as Hui and Uyghur, report an increase in harassment,
both online and in person. This Islamophobic backlash
occurs in conjunction with retrenchments by the Chinese
state on the right to practice religion. What gives rise to this
increase in bigotry? This pilot study examines official dis-
course about Islam through an inductive analysis of the pre-
sentation of Muslims in China's state media. Using a
process of constant comparative analysis, I examine the
state media's portrayal of Muslims in the flagship newspa-
per, The People's Daily. Drawing from a sample of 70 articles
published between 2014 and 2018, I argue that the party's
depiction of Muslim minorities in China emphasizes ethnic
rather than religious identities, while coverage of global
Islam emphasizes Islam as dangerous and associated with
extremism. I contend that such depictions carry the
unintended consequence of arousing suspicions about
China's Muslims among Han.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
“We must urge our family and friends that it is necessary to firmly resist the influence of religious extremism, and
resolutely defend ethnic unity and national integration,” implores an op-ed. column that graced the pages of The
People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), China's leading national newspaper, on May 29, 2014. The column appeared a little
over a month after a group of Uyghur assailants from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region armed with knives killed
31 people at the rail station in the city of Kunming. Continuing, the author asserted, “We must vigorously pass on
to others our positive energy, our love of country, our love of Xinjiang, our love of our brothers and sisters of all
nationalities, and use our actions to restore the true name of the people of Xinjiang!” (Tian, Yu, & Hu, 2014). By
singling out the perpetrators as agents sponsored by sinister forces seeking to disrupt China's stability, the article
deflected discussions of ethnic strife and reiterated the state-approved narrative of harmonious interethnic
relations.
In the following years, The People's Daily repeated these calls for resistance against religious extremism on
numerous occasions. In an essay published on September 25, 2015, the paper reminded citizens that
“ethnic unity is the most cherished, most valuable treasure for all the people of Xinjiang, but it can easily be
destroyed by only a small handful of people. In the face of terrorist activities, members of Xinjiang society
from all walks of life—party officials, college students and teachers, religious leaders, etc.—are filled with
righteous indignation and step forward bravely to unmask the true face of the ‘Three Forces’ (of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism)” (Fan, 2015). As before, the paper echoed party state-approved messages and
reasserted its claims that the actions of outsider extremists distorted the ‘true’ nature of China's ethnic politics.
In the version of events offered by The People's Daily, China's ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu) stood valiantly
against the so-called three forces (sange shili) of separatism, terrorism and extremism threatening to destroy
China's vibrant, multicultural unity.1 In calling on citizens to embrace the true, peaceful nature of ethnic
relations, the paper, again, downplayed conflict with China's Muslim minorities, rendering them instead as
peaceful, model citizens.
However, as these public calls for unity and vigilance rang out across the pages of The People's Daily, a very dif-
ferent kind of rhetoric brewed up on the Chinese internet. In the years following the 2014 Kunming attack, China's
Muslims reported an increase in online harassment. Chinese takeout services which delivered specialty halal meals
were bombarded with angry anti-Islamic comments (Lo, 2017). A feature from Hong Kong's South China Morning Post
recounted an instance in which a young Hui woman from Kunming who posted an image of herself and her friends
wearing a hijab on the social media platform, Weixin, was pilloried with hateful comments. Some of the aggressors
proclaimed “China needs no evil cults!” while others demanded “when are you going back to Arabia?” (Zhou, 2017b).
An article in The Independent documented a similar case from Hefei, the capital of Anhui Province, where a
community's plan to build a community mosque was met with vitriolic online backlash. According to the community
imam, these threats soon crossed into offline acts of harassment as a pig's head was buried on the construction site,
protestors rallied with anti-Muslim banners and members of the Muslim community began to receive death threats
via text (Shih, 2017).
Incidents like these point to a growing tide of Islamophobia in China. This rise in instances of online harass-
ment of Hui and Uyghur Muslims coincided with a nationwide crackdown on Islamic identity. Did official rhe-
toric from the state prime netizens to unleash such virulent antagonism? Examining the official media depictions
of Islam and Muslims provides an opportunity to examine the connection between regime rhetoric and public
opinion. Indeed, China's state-run media is a powerful tool for shaping public discourse and setting boundaries
on what the state deems acceptable dialogue on current events and public policy (Brady, 2008; Lynch, 1999;
Stockmann, 2013). As such, state media coverage presents a prism through which the Chinese party state's ide-
ology, policy priorities, and values may be seen. Accordingly, this article assesses whether the violent sentiments
that netizens espoused towards domestic Islamic communities online mirrored the posture and rhetoric of the
Chinese party state.
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In the remainder of this article, I further assess this relationship between official media and popular sentiment by
examining depictions of Islam and Muslims in China's official media. In so doing, I employ qualitative content analysis
to introduce a typology of these descriptions and analyse the manner in which they were presented. By systemati-
cally analysing how official media described Muslims, I may discern whether netizen harassment on social media plat-
forms resembled the party state line.
First, I present a brief overview of the role played by official media in disseminating legitimating narratives for
the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In particular, I assess how party state guidance on sensitive subjects like
interethnic relations attempts to frame coverage in a way that reinforces CCP-approved messages and supports the
regimes legitimating claims. Moreover, I assess how this close cooperation establishes clear parameters around how
media outlets discuss ethnic politics and mark out taboos in public discourse.
To identify the political messages surrounding Islam and Muslims embedded in official media, I present a
mixed-methods case study of coverage of the subjects in The People's Daily (Renmin Ribao). After an overview
which outlines the status of Islam and Muslim ethnic groups in China in the decade following the violence that
erupted in Urumqi, in July 2009, I conduct a qualitative content analysis of articles published in the paper.
Drawing on a sample of 70 articles published between 2014 and 2018, I employ the analytical technique
of constant comparative analysis to build empirically derived typology of descriptions of Islam and
Muslims appearing in articles printed in the paper. After establishing this taxonomy of descriptions, I employ
basic cross-tabulation analysis to compare the frequency with which the paper employed these different charac-
terizations. Lastly, to demonstrate how state media invoked these portrayals, I conduct textual analysis on the
sampled articles.
After this extensive analysis of the sampled text, I assess how the tone of coverage compares to popular anger
online. I conclude that The People's Daily's coverage emphasized the ethnic identity of domestic Muslim ethnic
groups—the Hui and Uyghurs—while highlighting the Islamic identity of Muslim communities abroad. I contend that,
through this strategy of ethnizicing the identities of domestic Muslims, the CCP attempts to reinforce legitimating
narratives that emphasize the party state's role in providing stability in interethnic relations, institute controls on
expression of ethnic and religious identities, and to discredit resistance from Muslim ethnic minorities as the work of
extremists manipulated by a dangerous foreign religious ideology. I also explore why these depictions do not align
with tone and content of netizens' virulent harassment. I suggest that the media's depiction of international Islamists,
and Islam itself, as dangerous creates a framing that indirectly arouses suspicion towards expression of religious
belief or outward religious behaviour on the part of China's Muslims. By de-emphasizing the religious identity of
China's Islamic ethnic minorities, the state creates a framing in which any outward religious behaviour may be taken
as a sign of dangerous extremism. Further, I propose that, by extensively praising China's Muslim minorities, The Peo-
ple's Daily might activate and deepen the ethnic resentments of Han chauvinist netizens and erode their trust in state
media. Finally, I call for a closer study of everyday roots of Islamophobia in China. I conclude with a call for a thor-
ough examination of the daily interactions and ordinary practices which engender fear of and antipathy for Muslims
among China's mass public.
2 | OFFICIAL MEDIA AND AUTHORITARIAN MESSAGING IN CHINA
As in other authoritarian states, China's media provides the party state with a highly visible platform for con-
ducting ‘thought work’ (sixiang gongzuo), and broadcasting the regime's legitimating narrative (Brady, 2009;
Kern & Hainmueller, 2009; Lynch, 1999; Saich, 2011; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Zhao, 2008, 24).
Zhao (2008, 24) contends that the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) is an ‘omnipresent body’ which uses
its great influence for the purpose of ‘sustaining the party's dominance in the area of ideology and culture’.
While characterizations of the Post-Mao era of ‘Reform and Opening’ depict China as adopting neoliberal
measures that reduced party state control in the area of enterprise, the CCP's micromanagement of the media
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expanded during this period (Zhao, 2008). Indeed, Brady (2009, 434) asserts, “assiduous attention to the
techniques of mass persuasion” allowed the CCP to weather the challenges posed by the 1989 Tiananmen
demonstrations and stabilize its rule.
As part of this oversight, the party state establishes guidelines that point to both approved narratives and clear
‘no-go’ subjects for coverage (Lynch, 1999, 3). Official media outlets act as mouthpieces for the regime to influence
public opinion and create a broad sense of agreement and consensus around the CCP's preferred narrative
(Brady, 2008; Zhao, 2008, 36). These sources distort or obscure information unfriendly to the party state, mis-
characterize events and offer citizens coverage that is nothing more than nationalistic propaganda that trumpets the
regime's success and papers over its faults (Brady, 2008, 71).
The success of such efforts requires a careful balance on the part of the CCP. While readers perceive ‘dangbao’
(party-sponsored papers), like The People's Daily, as presenting reliably accurate expressions of the CCP's policy prior-
ities, they are not viewed as credible or objective in reporting ‘real news’. Instead, as the epitome of a state-owned
newspaper that is closed off to privatization and reform, The People's Daily is widely understood as xuanchuan
(propaganda) that presents only positive messaging and discusses sensitive issues in a light which reflects the
CCP-approved line (Stockmann, 2010, 273–75). Unfavourable or dissenting points of view do not appear in such
publications. While the reform era brought changes in the media landscape that allow for reporting which demands
greater accountability and even lodges some critique at a localized level, the decisions of the party leadership or
strategic priorities of the central government remain off-limits for reproach (Y. Yang et al. 2014, 46–48).
Such a tightly controlled message on sensitive issues may only further stoke interest in topics considered taboo.
While The People's Daily may be seen as reporting on issues in a way that is generic, or abstract, alternative sources—
especially new media sources like microblogging or social media platforms—may be seen to mirror more closely the
experiences of ordinary people (Stockmann, 2013, 170–76). Netizens seeking less filtered commentary may turn to
these alternative sources and invest more trust in them to convey public sentiment more accurately (Shen
et al., 2011).
Despite such fissures, however, messaging in official state media does succeed in legitimating the CCP's leader-
ship. Support for the CCP is strongest among those people who are consistently exposed to state-run media broad-
casts, suggesting that propaganda exerts a ‘direct, positive influence’ on popular opinion about the party state
(Kennedy 2009, 521–528). As such state media has become a vehicle for the spread of nationalism, and patriotic
education (Brady, 2008, 52).
The CCP's propaganda apparatus employs an array of tactics to accomplish these ends. Through framing (tifa),
the party state's propaganda apparatus sets boundaries on what is and is not acceptable in public discourse. The
CPD (Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu) issues instructions on tifa via classified internal written communications or orally in
compulsory formal meetings. As a form of direct guidance from the party, tifa carries the weight of law and is scrupu-
lously observed. In practice, they act as a set of guidelines about what subjects and interpretations are and are not
appropriate for publication. Instructions contained within tifa may include fine-grained guidance on the ‘current
politically appropriate phraseology’, effectively dictating which words or descriptions ought to be used in particular
circumstances (Brady, 2008, 19). Further, these regulations on tone and message establish the core of China's cen-
sorship system by labelling subjects as out of bounds for coverage. These processes assure that competing explana-
tions are removed from official discourse and limit—though they do not eliminate entirely—public access to
narratives running counter to the party line (Brady, 2009, 445). These directives from the party state afford a high
level of adaptability to state media sources in addressing subjects that might threaten narrative control as they arise
(Zhao, 2008, 27).
To maintain the unity of message and consistency in coverage required for mass persuasion, China implements a
system of conglomeration and cooperation (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011, 442). Frequently this means that the pro-
paganda department must coordinate with other ministries or organs of the party state to shape messaging on a
given subject. This practice helps to diffuse the responsibilities of censorship by ‘turning each government depart-
ment into de facto gatekeepers’ of what content is appropriate (Zhao, 2008, 28, 32–34).
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3 | REPORTING ON ETHNICITY IN CHINESE STATE MEDIA
On the subject of ethnic affairs, the propaganda apparatus enacts stringent gatekeeping measures and relies on the
collaborations of an ‘ethnic sector’ formed among the CPD, the United Front Work Department (UFWD, Tongyi
Zhanxian Gongzuo Bu), and the State Ethnic Affairs Council (SEAC, Guojia Minzu Shiwu Weiyuanhui) (Brady, 2013).
The image of China produced by this close coordination is one of a unified, multiethnic country.
The CCP's consistent portrayal of minorities as a loyal and dependent— if exotic—'other' fosters attitudes of
internal orientalism among the majority Han. Such a portrayal of ethnic minorities as peripheral promotes a view
among the Han that the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the Chinese state represents a step in a ‘civilizing project’
taken on by the Han (Harrell, 1995, 3–36; Cliff, 2016b, 27–49). State media emphasizes the CCP's role in bringing
modernity to these ethnic communities, thus encouraging attitudes of Han centrism with reinforcing media coverage
of ethnic minorities. Stevan Harrell (2001, 304) reasons that “however poor and disadvantaged they may feel, (Han)
still think of themselves as superior to minorities in at least some respects.” Describing this phenomenon,
Schein (1997) argues that the CCP's depictions of ethnic minorities in popular media reinforce the notion of a Chi-
nese civilizational construct in which the Han occupy and advanced position at the centre and the non-Han inhabit a
place on the backward periphery.
Frequently, such coverage emphasizes the advantages the CCP bestows on ethnic minorities through preferen-
tial politics (youhui zhengce). Such praise allows the party state to claim fulfilment of its promises to establish social
and economic equality between the various groups residing within its borders (Zhang et al., 2018). Such reporting
intends to solidify ethnic unity and minimize the potential for ethnic conflict. State media is forbidden from publish-
ing on ethnic conflict or printing anything that might stir ethnic resentments, such as derogatory commentary on tra-
ditional ethnic culture (Brady, 2008). Rather, official reports promote negative propaganda to target and discredit
figures, like former World Uyghur Congress (WUC) leader Rebiya Kadeer or the Dalia Lama, as ‘splittists’, ‘terrorists’
or ‘traitors’ (Brady, 2013).
This kind of negative propaganda allows the party state to portray those who challenge its narrative as foils to
‘normal’ or ‘good’ members of the group. By signalling out figures like Kadeer or the WUC as ‘extremist’ the party
state sets them apart from other ‘normal’ Muslims who do not challenge the CCP's rule. Doing so enables the regime
to create a version of Islam in line with state objectives. Likewise, showcasing ‘good’ Muslims who express support
for the CCP reinforces the narrative of the party state's tolerant stance towards multicultural pluralism.
4 | ISLAMIC MINORITIES AND THE CHINESE PARTY STATE
Though state media paints the picture of China as a cooperative environment for religious and ethnic harmony, the
recent history of Chinese Muslims' relationships with the party state, and the non-Muslim, majority Han Chinese
reveals long-simmering tensions. Though the period between 1997 and 2009 saw a relatively peaceful phase of rela-
tions in China's northwest, the history of China's relationships with its Muslim communities is marked by sporadic
incidents of conflict (Millward, 2009). During the 18th and 19th centuries, spates of internecine conflicts in Muslim
communities in peripheral areas (in particular the northwestern provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang, and the
southwestern province of Yunnan) provoked the intervention of the Qing state, which often employed brutal force
in suppression (Atwill, 2005; Kim, 2004; Lipman, 1981; Schluessel, 2020).
Occasional outbursts of violence and clashes with the state persisted after the founding of the People's Republic
of China (PRC). In 1975, People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops aggressively shelled and fought a pitched battle with
Hui villagers engaged in an uprising in the small, rural village of Shadian in Yunnan (Solinger, 1982; Turnbull, 2015).
Similarly, after the consolidation of PRC control in Xinjiang in the 1950s, tensions frequently flared between the
state and ethnic Uyghur communities. Since the 1990s, cycles of violence and repression punctuate the course of
ethnic politics in Xinjiang, exacerbating the tensions already present between China's Muslims and the majority Han
STROUP 5
(Gladney, 2007; Roberts, 2020). Prominent among these incidents were the 1997 protests in Ghulja, which deterio-
rated into rioting and brutal repression by the police (Smith Finley, 2011). In July 2009 violence in Urumqi, the capital
of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region resurrected old prejudices against Uyghurs and tipped off a new round
of suppression and resistance between the state and Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Finley, 2011; Roberts, 2020). The attack
by Uyghurs on the Kunming train station in April 2014—which left 31 civilians dead—marked a new phase in the con-
tinuing saga of ethnic violence. After Kunming, the PRC employed a firmer hand in dealing with separatism. How-
ever, attempts to create security around Islam potentially achieved the opposite, leaving Muslims more vulnerable to
radicalization and Han more prone to feel that the state lacked the capacity to handle the violence (Trédaniel &
Lee, 2018).
The motivations behind these conflicts are economic and cultural as well as political (Millward, 2009). Rosalyn
Lim linked the continued outbreak of violence to the failure of China's ethnic minority policies to foster a sense of
equality between ethnic groups, particularly in the case of the Uyghurs (Lim, 2012). Many Uyghurs, especially entre-
preneurs, feel marginalized as they are pushed out of all but niche industries that produce ethnic goods or are forced
to rely on Han partners to succeed (Harlan, 2016; Cliff, 2016a). Han in-migration to Xinjiang and the stratification of
income along ethnic lines reinforce Uyghurs' feelings of marginalization as a result of Han political and economic
dominance. These grievances against the Han—and to a lesser extent the Hui—make Han citizens in Xinjiang the tar-
get of violent reprisal (Côté, 2015).
These social, economic and cultural factors produce a pervasive mistrust and misunderstanding between the
groups that further intensifies disputes. Educational programmes—even those like the ‘Xinjiang Class’ (Xinjiang neidi
gaozhong ban) which are designed to help facilitate Uyghur integration by providing opportunities for interethnic
exchange and communication—often discourage interaction between the groups and do little to mitigate or reduce
tensions (Grose, 2020). Uyghurs resent the dilution of their culture and the economic exploitation that occurs as a
by-product of Han in-migration and feel disrespected by the Han. Likewise, cultural chauvinism often causes Han to
characterize the Uyghurs as lazy, childlike, ignorant, superstitious or even dangerous. Uyghurs are often presumed
by the Han to be thieves, or worse, terrorists in league with Islamic fundamentalist groups (Kaltman, 2007).
Nor do such conflicts persist only in Uyghur communities. Tensions and misunderstandings also strain relations
between the Han and the Hui—usually portrayed as more integrated into the mainstream of Chinese society than
their Uyghur co-religionists (Brophy, 2019).2 Indeed, some suggest that the Hui are virtually indistinguishable from
the majority Han and that Hui assimilation is nearly complete (Li & Ji, 2015). However, the physical and cultural sepa-
ration of the Hui from the Han belies the accuracy of such claims (Gaubatz, 2002; Stroup, 2020). In fact, at various
points throughout China's history, disjuncture between Islamic law and the secular law of the state left the relation-
ship between the Hui and the state ‘riddled with microconflicts’ (Erie, 2016, 86–129).
This history of conflict with Muslim communities subsumes official state policy. Responding to fear that foreign
extremism may radicalize Muslims—especially in Xinjiang— the state enacted stringent controls on the practice of
religion, contributing to a continuing cycle of violence, repression and reprisal. The ‘Strike Hard’ (yanda) campaign,
formally enacted by Xi Jinping in 2014, instituted restrictions on religion that included banning Ramadan fasting, a
prohibition on growing beards or wearing headscarves, and criminalizing sharing non-government sanctioned reli-
gious commentaries or materials (Haas, 2017; Jacobs, 2016a). Testimony from those swept up by the campaign who
are now living in exile documents the criminalization of numerous other arbitrarily identified behaviours, such as
travelling abroad or using a VPN (Roberts, 2020, 205–213). A system of extensive monitoring, both via digital and
in-person means, was constructed to enforce such prohibitions and create an atmosphere of near-total surveillance
(Grose, 2021; Millward, 2018; Roberts, 2018). Violations of these policies have been punished with indefinite deten-
tion in internment camps—for the alleged purpose of de-radicalization—often without first undergoing public trial
(Millward, 2018; Phillips, 2018; Roberts, 2020, 212–20). By 2018, estimates of the number of people detained in
these camps reached as high as 2,000,000 (Roberts, 2020, 1).
Though Xinjiang serves as a testing ground for many of these policies, they are increasingly enacted elsewhere,
even in Hui enclaves, like Linxia in Gansu Province, which had previously stood as model Islamic communities
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(Zhou, 2017a). In Linxia, these measures include banning children's Arabic and Qur'anic study classes conducted at
community mosques over holiday breaks (Martina, 2018).
These heavy-handed measures intend to align Islam with the state's objectives. In his address to the 19th Party
Congress in October 2017, Jinping (2017) spoke of the need to Sinicize China's religious communities and ensure
that their teaching was aligned with the values of the party state, declaring ‘religions in China must be Chinese in
orientation’ and insisting that the CCP ‘provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt themselves to
socialist society’. However, the attempts to exert further control over religion and criminalize religious behaviours
that fall out of step with the state's priorities, risks the proliferation of further resistance.
5 | NETIZEN ISLAMOPHOBIA ON THE CHINESE INTERNET
As the state continued to crack down on Islamic minorities to curb behaviour that it deemed extremist, a rising tide
of Islamophobia emerged among the Chinese public. A wave of particularly vicious cyber harassment struck out at
China's Muslims following the 2014 attacks in Kunming as online forums like Weixin and Weibo became rumour
mills that incubated Islamophobic sentiment. A circle of Han Chinese who called themselves the ‘MuHei’ (Muslim
haters) bombarded these platforms with violent and threatening comments, derogatorily referring to Muslims as
‘greens’ (Zhou, 2017b). One post reprinted by Viola Zhou begins ‘let's shoot 100 greens’. Similarly, Luqiu and
Yang's (2017) study of 10,000 posts related to Islam on Sina Weibo concluded that these posts frequently pinned
blame for violence on Muslims—especially Uyghurs—and perpetuated unflattering stereotypes about practicing
Muslims. Such ethnicization of threat falls into a familiar pattern on Chinese social media. Leibold (2015) observes
that, in China's chatrooms and message boards, terms like terrorism and extremism are directly linked to ethnicity—
often paired with explicit racial slurs.
Profiles of the netizens posting virulently bigoted or threatening messages about Muslims tend to paint them as
so-called fenqing (‘angry youth’) nationalists who advocate policies that would promote Han supremacism
(Carrico, 2017; Leibold, 2010). These assessments suggest nationalist netizens fear that minority privilege leads to
Han disempowerment and cultural erasure. In the minds of these netizens, this renders the Han as the true victim of
the state's policies on ethnicity (Miao, 2020, 752–56). Such studies suggest that Han chauvinists netizens are more
prone to conspiratorial thinking that draws binaries between ‘good’ Han and ‘evil’ others (Carrico, 2017, 87–88,
153–54). Adopting a posture of victimhood leads to Islamophobic outbursts in response to perceived favouritism
shown to minorities and incubates a sense of outrage at the party state for privileging minorities at the expense of
the Han (Miao, 2020, 756–58).
However, recent examinations of Islamophobic, Han Supremacist activity on the internet suggests a wider
demographic base than mere fenqing. Zhang's (2020) case study of Han supremacist posts by zhihu (a question and
answer site similar to Quora) users found that strident nationalists on the platform were largely wealthier and more
highly educated than the average Chinese citizen. Moreover, Zhang's findings observed that the Han supremacist
tropes about Muslims and ethnic minorities blended previously existing tropes of Han supremacist ideology with
those form global far-right populist movements (Zhang, 2020, 95). Merging these two streams of discourse broadens
the popular appeal of Islamophobic rhetoric. Likewise, posts antagonizing Muslims became even more visible on
mainstream Chinese social media outlets following incidents of violence perpetuated by Muslims in 2014, mirroring
global trends (Leibold, 2016; Zhang, 2020).
In addition to the influence of mobilizing events, like the 2014 Kunming Train Station attack, posts by public
intellectuals on social media platforms like Weibo or Weixin played a role in normalizing Islamophobia and provid-
ing cues for ordinary netizens to follow in setting public discourse about Islam and Muslims (Zhang, 2020). Micro-
blog sites pushed alarmist narratives of the creeping Islamicization of China or the rise of ‘pan halalism’ written by
activist academics or policy institute heads, giving such fears credibility (Leibold, 2016, 13–14; Miao, 2020). By ret-
weeting or offering commentary on stories that carry Islamophobic messages, elite figures reinforce stereotypes
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and validate anxieties about Muslims in a way that can be reproduced by their large base of followers (Luqiu &
Yang, 2020, 268–69).
Likewise, the proliferation of discursive space opened by social media and microblogging—even on the heavily
monitored Chinese platforms—allows activist posters to distribute Islamophobic tirades and commentary via
accounts which adopt the presentational style as official news outlets (Luqiu & Yang, 2020, 267–68). Such anti-
Islamic statements, both from public intellectuals and from individuals posing as news sites on platforms like Weibo
and Weixin, serve to ‘legitimize public hostility’ and provide a template for other netizens to use in attacking Mus-
lims online (Luqiu & Yang, 2018, 611).
Looming over this public discourse about Muslims and Islam, China's state media also exerts a profound influ-
ence on how citizens engage with and understand the religion. Millward (2009) remarked that the riots marked a
tonal shift in the way state media outlets discussed the violence. Afterward, papers were careful not to invoke spe-
cific extremist groups in their reporting, rather invoking hazy, generalized threats. State media's avoidance of
specifics about which groups perpetuated violence signalled a shift in tone in which “‘terrorist’ now serves simply to
vilify, not to explain” (Millward, 2009, 355).
However, the impact of this official coverage on Islamophobic sentiment remains unclear. Looking at the cover-
age of the 2009 Urumqi riots, Joanne Smith Finely (2011, 77–78) notes that coverage often explicitly identified Han
victims of the riots by their ethnicity while neglecting to mention incidents of violence against Uyghurs. This cover-
age stoked the fires of Han nationalism and resentment towards Uyghurs. However, others suggest that disbelief in
the media's reporting on issues of ethnic violence compounds the damage. Millward's (2009, 351) recounting of the
official coverage of a 2009 factory riot in Shaoguan, Guangzhou, which was presumed to have fomented the anger
that sparked the Urumqi riots, suggests that many Han disbelieved the official frame put on the incident by state
media. The lack of credibility given to these reports, Millward contends, exacerbated the violence, as rumours were
taken more seriously than reporting.
6 | METHODOLOGY
To determine how Chinese media characterize Muslims—both domestic and foreign—I conducted a case study of
articles published in The People's Daily from January 1, 2014 to January 1, 2018. As China's leading newspaper, with
its position under the guidance of the CPD (Zhongxuanbu), The People's Daily provides a suitable representation of
the official party line on ethnic politics (Brady, 2006, 2009, 445, 2013). Utilizing the database of articles archived at
the China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (administered by CNKI), I drew articles published in the original
Chinese. I selected those articles whose subjects were listed under any of the keywords ‘Hui’ (huizu), ‘Uyghur’
(weiwu'erzu), ‘Muslim’ (musilin) or ‘Islam/Islamic’ (yisilan) for inclusion in the sample.
Selecting these terms reflected theoretical considerations. Firstly, they allowed for an assessment of how the
Chinese media described Muslims in general, as well as specific Muslim groups.3 Likewise, as the country's largest
newspaper, and the official newspaper of the CCP overseen by the CPD (Zhongxuanbu), The People's Daily provides a
representative sample of the official party line on ethnic politics (Brady, 2006, 2009, 445, 2013). The window of time
from which I drew articles (2014–2018) permitted the analysis of characterization of Muslims and Islam during a
period of renewed counterterrorism campaigns in Muslim majority provinces following Xi's declaration of the ren-
ewed Strike Hard Campaign in May 2014. In total, this sample identified 70 articles published during the 4-year
period sampled.
To conduct data analysis, I utilized an inductive coding process to produce a typology of characterizations of
Muslims in China. Following a process of constant comparative analysis as outlined by Glaser and Strauss (2009), I
conducted two stages of coding. First, following data reduction, in which I retained only sections of the text that
contained descriptions of Muslims using the four identified keywords (‘Hui’, ‘Uyghur’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’), I con-
ducted a round of open coding, producing an exhaustive list of characterizations of Muslims. In total, this analysis
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produced 64 discrete codes across the articles (see Appendix A). Once all lines of the sample had been coded, and a
point of coding saturation had been reached, a second, iterative round of axial coding grouped these characteriza-
tions into overarching categories. I repeated this process until all units of coded data were categorized into an exclu-
sive, equivalent and exhaustive typology. In total, this axial coding stage yielded seven types of substantive codes
and one category of descriptive code (see Table 1).
Upon completion of the coding process, I analysed the relationship between these categories using basic
crosstabulation analysis. This comparison illustrates the discrepancies between the way The People's Daily depicted
Muslims in general, and specific Islamic ethnic groups in particular. Following this analysis, I conclude that China's
state media distinguishes domestic Muslim ethnic groups, like the Hui and Uyghur, from the international Islamic
community. In describing domestic Islamic minorities, The People's Daily emphasizes ethnic identity rather than reli-
gious identity, describing Hui and Uyghurs as loyal, cooperative and patriotic citizens of the Chinese state. When
describing foreign Muslims, the paper frequently drew links between Islam and extremism and violence.
7 | ANALYSIS OF SAMPLED TEXTS
The People's Daily's coverages of Muslims exhibit stark contrasts between characterizations of foreign and domestic
communities. In the former case, Muslims appeared alongside depictions of religious extremism, and violent conflict.
However, when discussing domestic Muslim communities, The People's Daily emphasized ethnic rather than religious
identity and lauded the contributions of Hui and Uyghurs to China's economic development and societal harmony.
As indicated above, the second, axial coding stage produced seven substantive categories (and one category
which consisted of purely demographic descriptions) of Islam and Muslims across the sampled articles. Figure 1 illus-
trates these depictions in a pie chart. Across all articles, Islam and Muslims were most frequently described with lan-
guage falling under the category of Upstanding—stressing patriotism, cooperation, civic-mindedness and religious
moderation. Descriptions that fell under the category of Dangerous—emphasizing extremism, violence and difficulty
in assimilating—made up the second largest set of descriptions.
However, these raw totals do not provide a full understanding of the coverage. Closer examination of the results
of coding illustrates that state media employs a different set of characterizations when describing Islam generally
from those it uses to describe China's Muslim minority groups. A tabulation of the frequency of the occurrence of
each code across all articles (see Table 2) reveals that The People's Daily described Islam and Muslims as ‘dangerous’
with greater frequency than it did Hui or Uyghurs. In absolute terms, the articles described Islam as ‘dangerous’ in
48 instances. Muslims received this kind of characterization 18 times. Uyghurs were described as dangerous only
11 times, while Hui were not characterized in this manner at all.
TABLE 1 A typology of characterizations of Muslims in China's media
Parent code Codes contained within parent code
Advanced Cosmopolitan, educated, entrepreneurial, innovative, integrated, peaceful, progressive, prosperous,
secularized
Backward Irresponsible, migrant, parochial, poor, rural, uneducated
Dangerous Angry, extremist, restive, unassimilated, violent
Essentialized Charismatic, different, diverse, energetic, exotic, feminine, fun-loving, masculine, passionate
Upstanding Admired, brave, civic, cooperative, diplomatic, exemplary, indispensable, moderate, patriotic, politically-
organized, respected
Virtuous Compassionate, deferential, familial, friendly, generous, helpful, honest, industrious, moral, pious,
protective, respectful, traditional, wise
Vulnerable Dependent, filial, grateful, protected, victimized.
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Moreover, the articles characterized Islam as dangerous (48 instances) slightly more often than they described
the faith as upstanding (43 instances). The paper frequently mentioned international Muslim communities like those
in the Middle East or Europe alongside discussion of Islamist or extremist groups, like ISIS. Likewise, the paper called
attention to how extremist religious ideologies justified or valorized the brutal and violent actions. By contrast,
Uyghurs were described as upstanding (71 instances) far more often than they were described as dangerous
(18 instances). Similar discrepancies occur in the characterization of the Hui (17 instances of characterization as
‘upstanding’, versus no characterizations as dangerous). Thus, while coverage of international Islamic communities
routinely painted pictures of extreme ideologies and violent conflict, it routinely lauded the virtues of domestic
Muslim minorities (see Table 3).
In part, these differences reflect The People's Daily's ethnicization of China's Muslim minorities, especially as
compared to global Islam. In the latter case, the paper seldom noted the status of Hui and Uyghurs as Muslims.
F IGURE 1 Results of axial coding: Size of each type of characterization [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 2 Characterizations of Muslims by frequency
Code Advanced Backward Dangerous Essentialized Upstanding Virtuous Vulnerable
Islam 11 2 48 11 43 6 13
Hui 12 4 0 9 17 7 8
Muslim 6 4 18 5 34 5 23
Uyghur 36 27 11 23 71 49 17
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Mentions of the Hui or Uyghurs rarely occurred alongside invocations of Islam. Only two articles published over the
4-year period mentioned both the Hui and Islam. A mere three articles discussed both the Uyghurs and Islam. By
comparison, descriptions of foreign Muslim communities (coded as ‘international’) overlapped with specific discus-
sion of the Islamic faith in 10 articles. In describing international Islamic communities, The People's Daily focused on
Muslimness as a key component of the story, unlike the relatively de-Islamicized portrayals of their Hui and Uyghur
co-religionists.
The dissociation of the Hui and Uyghur from their Muslimness prioritized ethnic identities above religious ones
when describing the groups. When portrayed in this manner, as ethnic groups (frequently translated in Chinese as
minzu) stripped of association with faith, they may be contrasted to the Islamic community at large. Portraying Hui
and Uyghurs as ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu) first and foremost, The People's Daily casts outward religious obser-
vance as an aberration from the norm. Emphasizing the Muslimness of international Islamic communities reinforced
these associations of Islam with abnormality, especially when international Muslims frequently appeared alongside
images of violence. On these grounds, the party state characterized those believers who prioritized a religious iden-
tity as out of line with the mainstream or as potential religious extremists.
Examining the frequency of application of individual codes from within the categories of ‘dangerous’ and
‘upstanding’ illustrates this difference even more clearly (see Table 4). Uyghurs were described as extremist in only
one instance across the articles. Similarly, Hui never received such characterization. However, international Islamic
communities were described as containing extremist groups or being prone to religious extremism 42 times. Neither
Hui nor Uyghurs were characterized as the perpetrators of violent acts. By contrast, international Muslims were
described as committing acts of violence in 19 instances.
Such frequent invocations of extremism cast Islam itself as inherently prone to violence. Discussion of sectarian
violence or terrorist groups emphasized clashes between Islam and the state, suggesting that the conflicts pitted reli-
gious fundamentalists against secular forces. In one particularly acute example, the paper described, in extensive and
graphic detail, the violent carnage wrought by the Islamic State's attacks in Syria (Han, 2017a). This coverage rarely
mentioned that such violence was perpetuated by Muslims against other Muslims. Similar stories described the effort
of the Egyptian government to prevent the growth of extremist networks which might attempt regime change
(Han, 2017b).
When discussing Islam in non-Muslim majority countries, the paper highlighted tensions between religion and
secular western governments. Several articles discussed the difficulties faced by European states, like Belgium, in
integrating Muslims into mainstream society. Often, these reports remarked that Muslims remained apart from
others, living in enclave communities where the threat of radicalization loomed large. These accounts centred on the
state's attempts to stem the tide of radicalization and prevent young Muslims from going to Syria or Iraq to join ISIS





TABLE 4 Differences in characterization between Chinese and international Muslims
Code Extremist Unassimilated Violent Cooperative Moderate Patriotic
Hui 0 0 0 9 0 1
Uyghur 1 9 0 40 9 8
International 42 1 19 3 5 0
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(Ren et al., 2016). Elsewhere, The People's Daily reported on the struggles of Muslims living in the United States. Not-
ing their status as a religious minority, these accounts of Islam in America emphasized the levels of discrimination
and prejudice faced by American Muslims due to their religious faith (Gao & Huang, 2017; Zhang, 2016a, 2016b).
By frequently emphasizing conflict between Islam and the state, The People's Daily presented a picture of Islam
as a threat to secular, multiculturalism. Whether by depicting Muslims as extremists engaged in direct combat with
the state or as fundamentalists who refused to integrate into mainstream society, the articles reinforced sentiments
that in countries across the globe, Islam threatened to clash against forces of the state and produce destabilizing
social dilemmas.
In contrast to such bleak depictions of global Islam, The People's Daily painted a far more optimistic picture of
religious life in China. As Table 5 shows, Hui and Uyghurs were commended for their dedication to interethnic coop-
eration (coded as cooperative) a total of 49 times combined. These descriptions frequently lauded the groups' dedica-
tion to the ideals of minzu tuanjie (interethnic unity) and praised the harmony of multiethnic communities in which
Uyghurs and Hui lived alongside Han and Mongolian neighbours. Likewise, in a series of assessments on the status
of religious freedom in Xinjiang published in June 2016, The People's Daily chronicled the region's history as a home
to a diverse array of religious faiths, including Buddhism, Manicheanism and Daoism. One article in the series, sur-
veying the present-day religious landscape of the region, noted that “even though Islam has become the principle
religion of Xinjiang, the coexistence of multiple faiths continues there to this day” (The People's Daily (Renmin
Ribao), 2016). In recounting the region's history of religious pluralism, The People's Daily simultaneously marked Islam
as a foreign religion and distanced Hui and Uyghurs from their Muslim identities.
Indeed, rather than associating China's Muslim minorities with extremist violence, articles run in The People's
Daily went to great lengths to distance them from terrorist groups. An article from July 12, 2014 republished an open
letter from 354 delegates of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Minzu Chamber of Commerce, which
denounced extremist violence and proclaimed religious violence to be out of line with Uyghur culture:
We Uyghurs are a civilized people. We are a people who cherish knowledge. We are a hospitable
people. We are a kindhearted people. Terrorists use the majestic religion of Islam as a pretense. They
use it as a means of inflicting unspeakably brutal violence on innocent people, and to trample life.
They do not represent us Uyghurs, or even Muslims. They are but an extremely few violent terrorists.
(L. Han, 2014)
Instead, coverage of Hui and Uyghur communities often stressed the groups' gratitude to the Han-centric party
state for providing economic aid (see Table 5). In several feature articles meant to promote a narrative of interethnic
harmony, the paper recounted the story of communities of poor Muslim minorities—especially Uyghurs—who appre-
ciatively received the charitable aid of benevolent, selfless Han (Dai, Tian, Hu, & Yang, 2014; Dai, Tian, Yu, &
Renba, 2014; Liu, 2015). The reports observed Uyghurs' indebtedness to the Han for a diverse array of charitable
acts, such as furnishing adequate healthcare, establishing successful commerce in minority communities, or providing
aid to minorities in managing their flocks.
Other stories made such arguments about dependence directly by explicitly describing the special protections
Muslim minorities received from the party state. A profile of a Uyghur migrant enclave in Wuhan, capital of Hubei
TABLE 5 Depictions of Muslims as beneficiaries of state assistance
Code Poor Dependent Deferential Grateful Protected
Hui 0 4 0 0 3
Uyghur 5 10 2 1 5
International 2 2 0 0 0
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Province in eastern China, detailed the creation of a government aid programme to help recently-arrived migrants
integrate into the community and set up small businesses. The programme, the article attested, sought to give
Uyghurs ‘a good foundation’ to build on once they arrived in the community (Gu & Wen, 2014). One article, written
in the aftermath of an earthquake in rural Xinjiang in 2015, described the efforts of the military to secure safe spaces
in which Uyghur faithful could observe Ramadan prayer services. The reporting quoted a thankful Uyghur man who
testified “In the face of this disaster, we are all one family” (The People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), 2015).
Not only did these stories render Uyghurs as thankful to the Han, and by extension the centralizing forces of
party state, they also emphasized a state of dependence. Without Han assistance, the articles suggested, Muslim
minorities would lack access to the public goods associated with prosperity and modernity. In citing specific
government-sponsored programmes as ensuring migrant Muslims' well-being, The People's Daily portrayed the CCP
as directly responsible for providing these groups with access to prosperity. Escaping poverty and destitution came
only with the assistance of the party state.
Such characterizations of Muslim gratitude towards and dependence upon the party state dovetail with cover-
age that emphasized the exceptional degree of patriotism civic mindedness displayed by Hui and Uyghur communi-
ties. One article praised the efforts of two young Uyghur girls who presented Xi Jinping with hand-stitched brocade
embroidery at the Beijing exhibition celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
mous Region. The article drew attention to the harmonious message of the stitching, which proclaimed “Join
together to build the Chinese Dream!” (Yang & Hao, 2015). In a series of articles profiling the ‘Sino-Arab Interna-
tional Exhibition’ (Zhong-A Bolanhui) held in Yinchuan, capital of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, The People's
Daily celebrated the key role played by the Hui in building the foundations of China's ‘One Belt, One Road’ project.
According to article Hui in Ningxia served an instrumental role in extending cultural outreach to the Islamic world
(Li, 2015; Xu et al., 2015; Xu & Zhu, 2014). In these incidents, the paper characterized China's Islamic minorities as
willing and enthusiastic patriots doing their part to further China's economic development.
In depicting China's Muslim minorities as moderate, patriotic, and grateful citizens reliant on the benefits pro-
vided by the state, The People's Daily minimized their association with Islam, effectively ethnicizng them. The paper's
coverage set them apart from their international co-religionists, whose devotion to Islam was often depicted as
extreme. Promoting these types of images rendered Islam itself as dangerous and prone to violence. By contrast,
China's Muslims, rendered in ways that stressed their ethnic identity and belonging to the family of zhonghua minzu
(Chinese nationalities), were shown to practice their faith in a CCP-approved way.4 The Muslims portrayed by official
media contributed to implementation of China's development, safeguarded its societal stability, renounced extremist
religious ideologies from abroad, and patriotically affirmed the unity of the Chinese state.
A profile of a small, multiethnic community in the Tianshan Mountains published on May 29, 2015 best illus-
trates the rhetorical bent of the coverage. In describing the relations between the Han and Uyghurs who lived
together in the community, the article painted a picture of harmonious cooperation and mutual respect between the
groups. “In Xinjiang, minzu tuanjie is the lifeline of people of all nationalities,” the article declared. It continued to pro-
claim “Minzu tuanjie is the fundamental guarantor of long-term peace and stability.” Because of these powerful quali-
ties of ethnic unity, the article observed that “Xinjiang energetically promotes minzu tuanjie, and advocates for the
mutual respect, understanding, and trust of all nationalities. Hand in hand, we all work together to build a more
beautiful home.” Underlining this spirit of cooperation, the article concluded by quoting a local Uyghur citizen who
professed, “We're just like one great big family” (Tian et al., 2014).
8 | IMPLICATIONS
The coverage of Islam and Muslims by The People's Daily between 2014 and 2018 reflects the party state attempts
to shape public opinion through extensive framing. To promote an image of ethnic unity that aligned with a legitimat-
ing narrative which lauded the CCP as a provider of broad societal stability, official state media drew stark contrasts
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between international Islam and China's Muslim minorities. The paper's coverage framed international Islam as dan-
gerous, highlighting the religious identities of extremist groups and emphasizing their Muslimness. By contrast, the
paper ethnicized its presentation of domestic Muslim minorities, largely stripping away mentions of their Islamic
faith. These stories played up the groups' unique ethnic cultures and placed a spotlight on their patriotism and sense
of civic duty to state.
Such sharply divergent portrayals of foreign and domestic Islamic communities sought to externalize China's
own religious tensions, attributing incidents of violence in Muslim communities to extremist adherents of a foreign,
dangerous religious tradition. Doing so attempted to frame these incidents as the work of outside threat, rather than
the cause of legitimate grievances sparked by CCP policy. Purporting that Hui and Uyghurs were part of the family
of zhonghua minzu allowed the party state to emphasize its own tolerance of ethnic difference and trumpet its suc-
cess in maintaining harmonious interethnic relations.
Likewise, The People's Daily's portrayals also served as a means of control, marking the boundaries of appropri-
ateness for religious observance and expression. Much like other aspects of China's policies on ethnicity, these por-
trayals of Muslim ethnic minorities seek to establish what Louisa Schein (2000) refers to as ‘certain permissible
forms of difference’ that can be overseen and managed by the state. By setting standards for an acceptable expres-
sion of Islamic identity, the CCP may attest that they allow for tolerance of religious difference, while also esta-
blishing parameters which allow for the ‘occlusion of all other sorts of unruly heterogeneity’ (Schein, 2000, 73). As
such, The People's Daily's mostly positive coverage of Hui and Uyghurs as cooperative, obedient and reliant on the
state's aid serves as a foil for its coverage of global Islam as violent and extreme. Employing such descriptions allows
the state to promote its own, state-approved manner of practicing the faith, while associating non-sanctioned
practices with radical and violent Islamism.
However, the gap between official state media and popular discourse seemingly indicates that such rose-tinted
messages from the CCP, which stress harmony and equality, create unintended consequences, mostly in the form of
Han resentments. Indeed, the CCP's efforts to use mass media to promote a state-approved narrative may inspire a
backlash and work at cross-purposes to the party state's intent (Terrone, 2016). Schein (1997) contends that the
self-other contrasts inherent to the internal orientalist system of ethnic politics created by the CCP relies on a pro-
cess of myth-making that emphasizes the colourful nature of the ‘other’ while also stressing that such exotic quali-
ties render minorities as subtly dangerous. The party's consistently negative depiction of Islam in a global context
may unintentionally give rise to popular suspicion of domestic Muslim communities. A general climate of distrust and
antipathy for Muslims may result as an unintended consequence of the CCP's continually depicting global Islam as
associated with violence and extremism. Such prejudices are rooted not in moments of contentious upheaval, but
rather in day-to-day interactions that may magnify fear and suspicion of Muslims. Interactions with Muslim ethnic
minorities outwardly engaging in Islamic practice in their daily lives contradict the de-Islamicized depictions put out
by state media.
Further, by emphasizing only positive relations between Han and minorities, some activists may feel that state
media neglects to comment on the perceived harm done to Han centrism by multiculturalism. To some Han
netizens, the party state's distribution youhui zhenghce (preferential policies for ethnic minorities) to Hui and
Uyghurs is seen as coming at the expense of Han. Thus, Han netizens may see media coverage that trumpets the
CCP's success in aiding Muslim minorities as a celebration or policy that disadvantages Han. Ethnic minorities may
seem to be ungrateful recipients of ‘misdirected generosity’ from the party state (Carrico, 2017, 86–87). One Han
respondent I interviewed during my field research in Jinan expressed disdain for what she saw as ‘arrogant’ ( jiao'ao)
behaviour from the Hui—flaunting the privileges afforded them by the state and lording it over their Han
neighbours.5
In the most extreme cases, Han netizens may see such promotion of youhui zhengce as threatening to Han
culture itself. Chew and Wang's (2012, 6) study of online Han cultural conservatives finds that some view
preferential policy, like the previous exemption of minorities from China's ‘One Child’ population control
measures, as an ‘insidious device to suppress the growth of the Han ethnic group’. Because chauvinist netizens
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view these policies as occurring at the expense of the Han, seeing such positive coverage and special praise of
Muslims in the pages of state-led newspapers may thus intensify these feelings and contribute to further backlash
(Luqiu & Yang, 2018, 609).
Moreover, such carefully crafted messaging which portrays the party state as magnanimous and tolerant of mul-
ticulturalism may backfire if readers treat the rhetoric as no more than empty platitudes or propaganda. While cover-
age which stresses that China's Muslim minorities are loyal, upstanding, grateful recipients of government aid may
align with the party state's intended message, the general public may baulk at such descriptions, regarding them as
hollow or insincere. In the case of reporting on Muslims, the online discourse may reflect a feeling among netizens
that the People's Daily's positive, state-approved presentation of Hui and Uyghurs does not align with Han disaffec-
tion at perceived minority privilege given to these groups, particularly due to the CCP's facilitation of youhui zhengce.
Given these resentments, the positive coverage of Muslims in The People's Daily may further agitate
ethnonationalist netizens. Rosy portraits of Hui and Uyghurs in official media may arouse the ire of netizens who
view minorities as ungrateful recipients of China's ‘civilizing’ aid at the expense of the Han. Descriptions of Hui or
Uyghur culture, intended by official media to display a message of CCP benevolence and China's tolerance for diver-
sity, many be received by chauvinist netizens as an example of minorities' arrogant unwillingness to assimilate into
China's mainstream. More darkly, these stories netizens may see these stories as a sign of festering Islamic extrem-
ism that threatens Han culture. Such a gap between official rhetoric and netizens' perceptions of lived reality may
drive them to reject state media framings of ethnic politics and air their own grievances on alternative social media
platforms.
9 | DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
These findings point to a number of avenues for future study. Importantly, state media does not necessarily reserve
these tactics using outside extremist threats as a foil for domestic unity for describing Muslims. Similar descriptions
may be observed in the state media's coverage of unrest in Tibet. Recent People's Daily retrospectives on 70 years of
PRC rule in Tibet insists that the region's incorporation into the Chinese state has been nothing but beneficial to
Tibetans.6 This coverage points to the advancement of literacy and the construction of modern infrastructure
throughout the region, evidence of the benefits of Chinese rule and ‘liberation’ from the ‘Dalai clique’
(Barnett, 2010, 318). Further, it presents similar narratives of external actors using warped ideologies to undermine
ethnic unity in China. Though the Dalai Lama does not call for independence, the state criticizes him, and the Tibetan
government in exile.7 Media coverages fiercely characterizes his calls for genuine autonomy as ‘splittist’ and
therefore threatening to China's domestic stability and national security (Davis, 2007, 157–58). As it did with
Muslim minorities, media coverage frequently externalizes the cause of resistance in Tibet as being inflamed by
‘hostile Western forces’ working with the ‘Dalai clique’ in reporting falsehoods (Smith, 2010, 6–7; Barnett, 2010,
330–331).8
The observance of similar patterns of describing Tibetans implies that state media applies the tactics of
externalization of threat broadly to deal with popular discontent. Further comparative study using these cases
might illustrate whether such directives for describing ethnic minorities are standard within the state media's
narrative strategies.
The findings in this study also point to opportunities for future studies to make comparisons between state
media and sentiments expressed by netizens online. Even though the descriptions of Islam and Muslims that
appeared in The People's Daily between 2014 and 2018 presented China's Islamic ethnicities positively, the sample
period also saw the outbreak of online harassment of Muslims on platforms like Sina Weibo and Weixin. This
proliferation of online Islamophobia presents an opportunity to explore the ways in which the internet opens new
discursive space outside of the boundaries established by the official state line. In order to further explore this
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subject, future research might compare the way posters on Weibo and Weixin portrayed Islam and Muslims to those
official accounts examined in this study.
Further, the discrepancies between the elite-driven narratives about Islam and Muslims disseminated through
outlets like The People's Daily and the popular Islamophobia espoused on internet platforms presents an opportunity
for examining divergences between official state nationalism and everyday nationalism.9 Much of the online vitriol
aimed at China's Islamic communities expresses outrage at daily habits, such as keeping a halal diet or wearing a
hijab, that are seen as out of sync with Chinese culture and societal values. These daily encounters with Islam may
perpetuate a larger feeling of hostility towards Islam on the whole. Accordingly, looking at the daily experiences of
the non-elite, mass public may allow for a better understanding of why Islamophobia persists despite such positive
coverage from state media. A study of the everyday roots of Islamophobia among Han Chinese would also heed Jon
Fox's (2017) call for scholars to seek ‘the edges’ of ethnic and national identity by asking breaching questions and
confronting the subject of ethnicity directly. By uncovering prejudices that might be considered taboo, aspects of
identity that might otherwise remain taken for granted might emerge and present a more rounded picture of the
content of both Islamophobia in China and Han majority ethnicity.
ENDNOTES
1 The term minzu is used by the state to refer to China's 56 officially recognized ethnic groups. While the state has often
used the term to mean ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnic group’, translation of the term is the subject of scholarly debate, with many
electing to leave the term untranslated. China's 55 minority groups are referred to as shaoshu minzu.
2 See, for example, depictions in international media outlets that depict the Hui as passive in contrast to Uyghur restiveness
given in Jacobs (2016b) and Beech (2014).
3 The Hui (population 10.6 million) and Uyghur (population 10 million) represent China's two largest Islamic ethnic minority
groups according to the 2010 national census. While the Hui and Uyghur are not China's sole Islamic minorities (others
include the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Dongxiang, Salar, Tajik, Bonan, Uzbek and Tatar ethnic groups), they comprise approximately
89.25% of China's 23 million Muslims; see “Sixth National Population Census of the People's Republic of China, 2010.”
2013. Census. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.
4 Though state media is silent on what a state-sanctioned practice of Islam might entail, other messages from the party
emphasize loyalty to the state and obedience of the law as core tenets of the faith. The nearly ubiquitous banners proc-
laiming ‘Love your country, Love your faith. Know the law, abide by the law’, (Ai guo ai jiao. Zhi fa, shou fa) and more
recently ‘Love your country, Love the party’ (ai guo, ai dang) illustrate this. Likewise, the curriculum of scriptural interpre-
tation ( jiejing) promoted by the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA, Zhonguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui), which stresses patriotism and
territorial and ethnic unity as core values of the faith is instructive. For more, see Glasserman's (2016) discussion of jiejing
and the CIA.
5 Interviewed by author. November 11, 2015. Jinan.
6 For example, see Wang Fei, “Xin Xizang 70 nian: kaifang retu, huoli Xizang,” The People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), May
31, 2021, http://xz.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0531/c138901-34753445.html; Wang Yahui and Yang Ziyan, “‘Xizang
heping jiefang yu fanrong fazhan’ baipishu zai Xizang fanxiang qianglie,” The People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), May 23, 2021,
http://xz.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0523/c138901-34740556.html.
7 For example, see “‘Zangdu’ zuzhi hao wu hefa xing” The People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), January 7, 2021, http://hb.people.
com.cn/n2/2021/0107/c194063-34515148.html.
8 For example, see “‘Zangdu” zuzhi hao wu hefa xing” The People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), January 7, 2021, http://hb.people.
com.cn/n2/2021/0107/c194063-34515148.html.
9 Here, I draw on the body of recent scholarship in the field of everyday politics which encourages scholars to examine the
routines and habits of daily life to find the political significance found therein. See Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Goode &
Stroup, 2015; Bonikowski, 2016.
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APPENDIX A: CODES AND DESCRIPTIONS
Code name Description
Advanced
Cosmopolitan Described as being sophisticated, cultured, etc.; used especially with words like 文明.
Educated Depicted as achieving high levels of education or as being intellectuals.
Entrepreneurial Mentions of starting a business.
Innovative Depicted as developing technology, making the way for progress, etc.
Integrated Expressing a belief that group is blended in linguistically, culturally, religiously, or otherwise, to
mainstream Chinese society; used with words like 融合.
Peaceful Description of Islam as a “religion of peace” or Muslims as ‘peaceful’; used with words like 和平,
和谐.
Progressive Described as embracing technology, progress, scientism, etc.
Prosperous Described as having become rich or benefitted from development.
Secularized Makes mention of unfamiliarity with Islamic traditions or practices.
Backward
Irresponsible Depicted as not paying attention to obligations, responsibilities; social/economic, or otherwise.
Migrant Depicted as having arrived from outside China, or as originating outside China.
Parochial Described as being, culturally conformist, narrow-minded, burdened by tradition, etc.
Poor Described as not having lots of money or being impoverished.
Rural Reference to profession as herders, farmers, etc.; used with words like 农民, 牧民.
Uneducated Depicted as lacking formal training, education or literacy.
Dangerous
Angry Depicted as irritable, or angered.
Extremist Depicted as holding or being vulnerable extreme ideas, about religion, nationalism, etc.; used
with words like 极端.
Restive Depicted as taking part in riots, conflict or argument.
Unassimilated Noted as not being able to speak standard Mandarin, or not adhering to Chinese societal norms
and customs.




Local majority Described as being the largest population in a locality, especially if compared to Han.
Minority Any description of population statistics that emphasizes either the percentage of the minority
population or the majority position of the Han.
Undifferentiated Referring to Muslims as “masses”; used with words like 群众, or 群体.
Essentialized
Charismatic Described as being compelling, through speech or conversation, etc.
Different Emphasizing physical difference from the majority Han in appearance, or surprise when such
difference is not present.
Diverse Muslims discussed as being a multi-ethnic group; used with words like 各民族, 多民族, 多彩.
Energetic Described as being enthusiastic, excited, full of life, etc.
Exotic Referring to traditions as different, colourful, etc., especially compared to Han.
Feminine Described as being effeminate, womanly, feminine, etc.
Fun-loving Described as liking to laugh or play.
Masculine Described as being manly, masculine, etc.
Passionate Described as being enthusiastic, passionate, etc.
International Describing Muslims in other countries.
Upstanding
Admired Possessing cultural or other characteristics that others appreciate, enjoy, imitate, etc.
Brave Described as being brave, heroic, courageous, etc.
Civic Described as involved in community improvement, building prosperity, stability, etc.
Cooperative As working with Han, or other minorities; as helping the common good, etc.; used with words
like 团结.
Diplomatic Described as being representatives on a world stage, etc.
Exemplary Described as being a “model,” or being an example to follow.
Indispensable Depicted as being necessary for economic advancement, social development, stability, etc.
Moderate Descriptions as opposed to religious or ethnic extremism or violence.
Patriotic Depicted as loving their country, their compatriots, their homeland/province, etc.
Politically
organized
Descriptions of Islamic or Islamist political parties
Respected Described as being treated fairly, deferentially, courteously etc.; used with words like 尊敬, or 尊
重.
Virtuous
Compassionate Described as showing concern of the welfare of others, especially Han.
Deferential Shown as consulting other nationalities, especially Han.
Familial Includes references to common citizenship or common cultural heritage.
Friendly Depicted as friends or companions, especially with Han; used with words like 朋友, 友好, 熟人.
Generous Described as giving to others, especially food, hospitality, or charity money.
Helpful Depicted as giving assistance, or accommodation to others, especially the Han.
Honest Described as being truthful, forthright, telling truths, etc.
Industrious Describing study for self-improvement, attempts to better life circumstances.
Moral Depicted as being upright, conscientious, or good character.




Protective Described as looking out for the safety and security (physical, economic, etc.) of others,
especially Han.
Respectful Depicted as giving respect to others, especially Han; used with words like 尊敬, 尊重.
Traditional Described as concerned with preservation of language, tradition, culture, etc.
Wise Depicted as possessing wisdom, sagacity, etc.; used with words like 聪明, 智慧.
Vulnerable
Dependent Described as needing assistance, aid, or paternal care taking, especially from the Han.
Filial Described as respecting parents, or being a good or obedient son or daughter.
Grateful Described as expressing gratitude, or thanks, especially to Han; used with words like 感谢.
Protected Citing legal protections or accommodations for Muslims/ethnic minorities (e.g. holiday
observance, dietary habits, etc.)
Victimized Described as being victims of attacks, persecution, etc.
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